Rohan Venkat
Sep 23
“An unprecedented boost for India’s global stature,” said the Bharatiya
Janata Party’s JP Nadda. “A historic milestone in bridging the global trust
deficit,” said Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. ”An indelible victory mark for
every citizen of our country,” said Home Minister Amit Shah.
That was back in 2023, after the ‘DelhiDeclaration’ at the G20 summit
Three years later,
we have another consensus document – the New Delhi Declaration this time (here’s Devirupa Mitra on the specifics) – and much less fanfare about
what it all means.
If the G20 came
with “blockbuster” sideline announcements, including the India-Middle East-Europe
Economic Corridor (on which we’ve written about aplenty), the Global Biofuels Alliance and
the impression of having involving the domestic population in the grand
spectacle of global summitry; evaluations of the BRICS gathering were decidedly
less bombastic.
Ashok Malik, for
example, primarily commended India for “convening even rival Persian Gulf states and
drafting a statement that while admittedly a compromise… offered language
everyone could take home.” Rajiv Bhatia’s conclusion was that the summit effectively demonstrated that “a believer like
India and other fellow travellers remain fully invested in [BRICS].” Happymon
Jacob wrote, “the media commentary has generally tended to portray the summit
as a moment of great geopolitical consequence. In reality, the summit is far more modest, and the Indian agenda, quite realistically,
reflects that.”
C Raja Mohan put it
even more bluntly: “Delhi’s diplomatic success lies in keeping BRICS “boring”.”
BRICS Background
There is important
context here, especially if you’re not familiar with the (sometimes
stultifying) debates of the Delhi foreign affairs bubble. BRICS was set up in
2009 as an emerging market response to the West-dominated G7. It was originally
founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, despite vast economic differences between them. It has since expanded to include
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia and the UAE. Today it represents more than
half of the world’s population, compared to just 10% in the G7. It’s share of
the global economy has also seen a huge increase over the last decade.
But, as Surjit Bhalla points out, most of that increase is down to
one country (emphasis added):
“BRICS went from
21.9 per cent of world income in 2011 to 28.9 per cent in 2025… Now remove
China. The other ten members were 11.9 per cent of world income in 2011 and
11.5 per cent in 2025… China went from 10.0 to 17.4 per cent. It accounts for
72 per cent of the entire increase in BRICS income over the period — and
because the others lost ground, for rather more than all of the increase in the
bloc’s share of the world… Inside the club, the concentration is starker. China
was 45.6 per cent of BRICS income in 2011 and is 60.2 per cent now. Among
the five long-standing members it has gone from 54.1 per cent to 68.9 per cent.”
That’s the backdrop
to the Delhi BRICS debates. Simply put, should India be member of a club that
its so thoroughly China dominated, at least economically, and therefore could
be used to further Beijing’s aims? This goes hand in hand with the general
impression that BRICS is out to undermine the Western dominated order, a
narrative that US Donald Trump has fully embraced, even as India takes pain to
insist that it is a ‘non-West’ grouping not an ‘anti-West’ one.
Given New Delhi’s
discomfort with China, and its hopes of building a future alongside its Western
partners – whether that’s the US (India’s biggest export market), the EU (with which
it just signed a big-ticket FTA) or Japan & Australia (Quad partners that
fall under the ‘Western’ label) – there have been perennial worries that
BRICS will be turned into a Cold War-style bloc with India finding itself on
the wrong side of the divide.
This is what
inspires commentary, like this by Rajesh Rajagopalan, calling on India to stay
in the group in order to sabotage it (emphasis added):
“What China is
attempting to do is what great powers have always done, which is use
international groups and institutions to serve their own interests… No talk
about multipolarity can hide the dispiriting disparity in power between China
and the other members of BRICS. India is definitely not strong enough to
control the group… The question then is what India can actually do, considering
it is a member of a group that is—whatever India pretends—clearly anti-Western
in orientation and likely to side with China on most issues… India’s purpose
within BRICS then should be clear: to ensure that the group becomes nothing
more than a useless talk-shop that is internally divided and an unviable
vehicle for China’s great power ambitions.”
Back in 2023,
Arvind Subramanian and Josh Felman even argued that India should quit BRICS because of China’s domination of the
club.
BRIC-a-brac
Not everyone
agrees.
Some, like Gulshan
Sachdeva, would like to see BRICS as a much more intentional platform for
India’s foreign policy: “If New Delhi is confident about its Viksit Bharat
2047 narrative, it must also start working towards deeper trade integration within BRICS rather than settling
for soft commitments and sector-specific initiatives. It should also promote an
energy-centred alternative financial architecture, explore alternatives to OECD
DAC development architecture, and develop a BRICS connectivity strategy.”
Few others see any
likelihood of BRICS increasing Indo-China cooperation, even as the
summits offer a useful platform for the leaders of the two countries to meet
without having to expend political capital on bilateral gatherings. The more
general read is that India will seek to preserve BRICS for a relatively fuzzy
set of goals, none of which would be achieved were New Delhi to step away.
As Aparna Pande puts it, “for India, [BRICS’] value lies in its versatility. It is broad enough
to amplify its voice, flexible enough to preserve strategic autonomy and
divided enough to prevent any one member, including China, from easily
dominating it.”
Rishap Vats goes
further, arguing that India shouldn’t have to apologise for its membership in
the grouping and can actually look to China’s own experience joining
Western-dominated multilateral institutions as a template for how to operate:
“Despite its growing integration with
US markets, and the obvious asymmetry between the two, it was rising US
unilateralism that pushed China to start joining regional groupings to blunt
American order-building in Asia…. India’s participation in BRICS] does not
automatically reinforce China’s leadership claims, in Asia or in the Global
South. Its absence certainly would…
China’s strategy of
displacement in the post-Cold War era was not simply about joining regional
organisations for limited material or social rewards. It was also about
undermining US leadership in Asia and complicating American involvement in the
region, not because it expected to close the power gap soon, but precisely
because it could not yet do so… Indian strategy should not be frightened into
letting every so-called contradiction decide the outcome.”
From a European
vantage point – given the announcement of Canada as an ‘associate member’ of
the European Union (without clarity on what that means) and the launch of the ‘Partners for Multilateralism’ grouping at the United Nations
– the BRICS summit and India’s positioning within it offer some view of
what a newer order with middle-power agency (even if neither the EU nor India
loves the term ‘middle power’) might look like.
Lizza Bomassi and
Ummu Salma Bava write (as before, emphasis added):
“This is what makes India’s BRICS
presidency interesting. It is not simply another demonstration of New Delhi’s
ability to balance competing relationships… It also raises a broader question
of whether India’s ability to operate across competing institutional
environments could serve a wider purpose: keeping channels of communication
open across political divides and helping workable ideas circulate between
them. The goal is not necessarily convergence but to prevent differences from
becoming more permanent forms of separation…
This is a
potentially useful way of thinking about the next phase of multi-alignment: not
only as a means of preserving strategic autonomy but also as a means of
creating a kind of connective tissue across divides. The implication is
not that countries should be trying to join every grouping available to them.
Institutional presence is, by itself, probably insufficient. But in a
fragmented ecosystem, some countries may have genuine value precisely because
they have the credibility and diplomatic network to operate across political
clusters.”
(Whether all of
this will work for BRICS now that China has the presidency over the next year
is a whole other matter, raising big questions for India over the coming 12
months as well).
‘Boring’ Bharat
India as the
connective tissue for global conversations across divides would, of course, not
be a new formulation for anyone familiar with the history of New Delhi’s
foreign policy. But it’s a few steps removed from the ambitions on display in
2023, when India sought to present itself as a pole in a multipolar
order, rather than a bridge across divides.
Remember, those
were the years of IMEC and the Indo-Pacific, Modi as the ‘vishwaguru,’ and “War rukwa di, papa”, and a time when “foreign policy was on the ballot.” Of course, 2024 was also the year
that Modi’s electoral machine sputtered. And while Trump’s return to the White
House was initially seen with enthusiasm in New Delhi, subsequent events have
revealed just how little India’s interests matter to Washington, DC, and how limited
its reach is, even in its own ‘extended neighbourhood’, as with the Gulf war.
As Kate Sullivan de
Estrada wrote on CASI’s India in Transition, New Delhi has turned to free
trade agreements to make up for the lowered global salience of the
Indo-Pacific, which brought it so much attention over the previous decade. And,
in a piece we just published on IiT, Abhinandan Kumar points out that
the BRICS summit was handled very differently from the G20, suggesting “a more
selective approach to international summitry that is shaped by altered
geopolitical circumstances and the limits of reproducing diplomatic spectacle indefinitely.”
India’s Ministry of
External Affairs is quite familiar with the task of carrying out the ‘boring’
work of quiet diplomacy, pushing forward the trade files and painstakingly
organising summits. But, after a decade in which India’s foreign policy was
increasingly presented as a series of Modi’s personal achievements, what would
a more ‘boring’ strategy mean for the prime minister?
In an essay for
Carnegie’s series on ‘the Populist Turn in Middle Power Diplomacy, Sandra Destradi
looks at the Indian case:
“Continuous domestic political
mobilization—the ongoing effort to rally public support—is a key feature of
populist politics, including in India. Populist politicians do not confine
mobilization to election campaigns; instead, they seek to continually activate
and enlarge their constituency even after assuming office…
Modi has used India’s engagement in
international institutions as a vehicle for domestic political mobilization by
explicitly linking his personal leadership to India’s rising global stature…
A massive campaign elevated the
rotating presidency into a symbol of foreign policy success, with the G20
logo—depicting a globe embedded in a lotus flower, the BJP’s party
symbol—displayed prominently across the country. Rarely has the connection
between domestic political mobilization and international diplomacy been so
visible…
By presenting
himself as both the authentic voice of the people and as a globally respected
statesman, Modi links external recognition to national pride. Global visibility
is reframed as collective recognition of India, and the resulting sense of
pride feeds back into political support for the leader who claims to have
delivered it.”
Free trade
agreements (which are complex and can have messy outcomes) and quiet
bridge-building are much harder to transform into domestic status building,
however, which may be why Modi had to find some notes in his BRICS speech that
would allow for a bit of chest thumping (click to see the coverage across
Indian media):
Churumuri @churumuri
One
nation, One weaponisation Newspaper headlines of the BRICS tamasha in Delhi
show what foreign affairs reporting really is: glorified stenography. @MEAIndia
#WhatsApp
So, is the future
of Indian foreign policy more ‘boring’, after the heady rushes of the early
2020s when India’s perennial future superpowerdom seemed once again just around
the corner? And what does that mean for Modi, as he prepares for the mid-way
point of his third term in power?
Source: https://tinyurl.com/bdhjm7ak