A century of Telugu dance traditions

Features » Friday Review            Hyderabad, July 24, 2014
Updated: July 24, 2014 19:57 IST

Neeraja Murthy

WITH A CREATIVE ZEAL Ashish Mohan Khokar and dancer Ananda Shankar Jayant. 
Photo: G. Ramakrishna

In focus The 16th edition of the annual dance magazine ‘attendance’, titled Telugu Traditions, chronicles the glorious history of classical dances of Telugus, with a focus on the future.

“This is my sweet 16 romance and the sweetest,” jokes Ashish Mohan Khokar, renowned dance historian, writer and founder of ‘attendance’, a magazine dedicated to dance, as he makes himself comfortable at Hotel Harita Plaza in Begumpet. Danseuse Ananda Shankar sitting next to him breaks into peals of laughter. The duo’s energy levels are at a high with the national launch of the 16th edition of ‘attendance’ titled Telugu Traditions. Over the past 15 years, ‘attendance’ has been taking a step back in time every year to narrate the story of classical danceculture in India. As the editor, publisher and writer of the dance magazine, Ashish travels far and wide and this is his first visit to Hyderabad. “attendance looks back, focuses and chronicles the milestones crossed by dancers, along with events as well as articles by experts. Every year we highlight a perspective, from putting a spotlight on performers to drawing attention to dance forms… it’s is an attempt to document and preserve the dance culture of India,” he says.

This year, ‘attendance’ with guest editor as Ananda Shankar Jayant looks back at all Telugu traditions in classical dance. (“There may be political boundaries but artistic boundaries are none.”). “A music lover could be in Czeckhoslvakia or Chikkaballapur and might not know the nuances but equally enjoys a Thyagaraja composition or a Rahman number. In the same way, the classical dance traditions could be in many styles but still one looks at them all in awe,” says Ashish.

Telugu Traditions looks at the spectrum of myriad classical dance traditions of the Telugus — Kuchipudi, Andhra Natyam and Vilasini Natyam.

While Pratima Sagar has designed the layout, the book has 55 articles. “The narrative spans Telugu dance traditions from the ’20s in their myriad manifestations, through the fading voices of nonagenarian gurus, coursing through the vision of extraordinary performers and teachers, across nearly a century, who have written the history of Telugu Yakshagana, Kuchipudi, Andhra Natyam, Vilasini Natyam and Perini,” reveals Ananda.

The book includes a host of articles, interviews, personal memoirs, books, research articles, and write-ups highlighting the creative journey of unique artistes, who have shared personal stories of their lives in dance, in-depth articles on repertoire covering Bhamakalapam, Golla Kalapam, Yakshagana, Simhanandini, path-breakers holding the Kuchipudi flag aloft overseas, senior performers and teachers in India and male dancers making a mark.

Also finding space in the book are snippets from Telugu films, filmmakers (like an interview with K. Viswanath for Sankarabharanam) and film music that encompassed classical dance in various forms.

Besides overseas contributions, the yearbook also looks at early gurus who choreographed for films, television dance archives and even the attempts to garner Guinness book records.

The book is not just a chronicle of the glorious history of Dance among Telugus, but has its eyes set on the future too. The spotlight is on young talent, such as the emerging dancer in Kuchipudi, Yamini Reddy.

Ashish says Telugu Traditions will be a one-stop companion for dancers, academicians, young researchers, scholars and policy makers (“especially when it comes to choosing dancers for awards”).

For Bharatanatyam dancer Ananda, it has been a shift in gear for a year now. “Being the guest editor is my thanksgiving offering to Kuchipudi,” smiles Ananda, who has also been trained in Kuchipudi. While Ashish has already begun his work on the next year’s issue of ‘attendance’, a tribute to Zohra Sehgal, he is happy and satisfied with the outcome of Telugu Traditions. “The delivery for the 16th child has been an easy one,” he smiles.

Source: The Hindu

Misunderstanding a good judgment

Opinion » Comment                                                                 July 19, 2014
Updated: July 19, 2014 02:51 IST

Saif Mahmood
 

FAITH AND LAW: The Court’s judgment will neither stop ignorant
mullas from issuing bizarre fatwas nor prevent ill-informed people from
publicly expressing their ostensibly anti-Islamic prejudices under the
garb of supporting equality. Photo: K. Murali Kumar

The Supreme Court ruling on fatwas is mindful not only of the law of the land and the deplorable condition of Indian Muslims but also of religious sensitivities in the country

“Historical judgment in India: Fatwas, Shariat courts illegal, says Supreme Court”, “Supreme Court slams Shariat Courts, says fatwas are ‘illegal’”, “‘Shariat courts not legal’” — these are some of the headlines that were carried by national dailies in India. As the media went hammer and tongs in its pursuit to make people believe that shariat courts have, indeed, been banned by the apex court, ill-informed ‘experts’ hailed this exceptional “Constitutional victory”, and Muslim clerics refuse to tolerate “judicial interference” in their religious affairs.

Has the Supreme Court really held that shariat courts and fatwas are “illegal”? A bare reading of its judgment delivered on July 7 in Vishwa Lochan Madan v. Union of India would suggest otherwise.

Resolving disputes

At the outset, both the Court and the petitioner have confused two issues. The first is of fatwas being issued by clerics, and the second is of shariat courts. The two issues are independent and distinct. A fatwa is an opinion on a religious matter which ought to be sought from and delivered by a well-read religious scholar. In practice, however, Muslims seek such opinions from maulvis presiding over small mosques in every nook and corner of the country, who are often far too ignorant to even lead prayers, much less render scholarly opinions on sensitive inter-personal issues. Clerics, both well-read and ill-informed, have been rendering such opinions on a variety of issues ranging from the correct method of cooking food to the pre-requisites of a valid divorce. As is the case with every opinion, it is up to the querist to accept or reject it. Undoubtedly, the religious flavour of such opinions read with the religious sensitivities of Indian Muslims demands that, at the very least, strict self-regulatory rules ought to be framed in this matter.

From the early twentieth century, an institution called the Dar-ul-Qaza, known in common parlance as the shariat courts, has been operating in many parts of the country. The Dar-ul-Qaza is devised as a permanent alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism to resolve family disputes of consenting parties. Like in arbitration, if both parties agree, instead of a civil court they may approach the Dar-ul-Qaza for resolution of their disputes. The Dar-ul-Qaza does not issue fatwas. It also does not administer criminal law; it simply resolves family disputes by applying principles of Islamic law, which even civil courts are bound to apply in cases where both parties are Muslim (just like if both parties are Hindu, the disputes will be resolved in accordance with Hindu law). Muslims, like all other citizens, continue to be governed by the law of the land and be subject to the jurisdiction of Constitutional courts in equal measure.

Issue before the Supreme Court

In 2005, a 28-year-old uneducated Muslim woman named Imrana was allegedly raped by her father-in-law in a village in Western Uttar Pradesh. A local Muzaffarnagar-based journalist approached the well-known Islamic seminary in nearby Deoband and, without disclosing the facts of this particular case, sought a general opinion (fatwa) on the status the marriage of a woman who has been raped by her father-in-law in a hypothetical case. An ill-informed cleric who had no business to render opinions in such sensitive matters, opined that, in such a case, the victim’s marriage with her husband would stand dissolved. He founded his opinion on the Quranic edict which commands men to “marry not the woman whom your father married”. It is needless to accentuate how bizarre the opinion was and how misplaced was the reliance on this salutary Quranic edict. The fatwa was, rightly, rubbished by scholars across the board. The matter rested there was never taken to the Dar-ul-Qaza.

Appalled by the absurdity of the fatwa and its ramifications, a Delhi-based lawyer approached the Supreme Court by way of a public interest petition and alleged that Muslim clerics who have set up shariat courts all over the country are rendering judgments like courts in the form of fatwas and are, thus, running a ‘parallel judiciary’ in the country. Somewhat confusingly, he clubbed together the two different and distinct issues of fatwa and establishment of shariat courts. In his petition, he impleaded as Respondents the Union of India, some States where Dar-ul-Qaza were running, and some Muslim religious organisations like the All India Muslim Personal Law Board, and sought declarations from the Supreme Court to the effect that the very establishment of the Dar-ul-Qaza was illegal and the fatwas so issued were void. He also sought a direction to the Union of India and the States concerned to forthwith take steps to disband all Dar-ul-Qazas throughout the country.

In response to the petition, all the Respondents took a common stand. Broadly speaking, their argument seemed two-fold — first, that the Dar-ul-Qazas were not in the nature of civil or criminal courts but were, in fact, institutions devised as ADR mechanisms. Like other ADR mechanisms, this could also be used by consenting parties to resolve their private disputes out of court; no one can be forced to acquiesce to the jurisdiction of the Dar-ul-Qaza. Second, fatwas issued by clerics were merely their opinions on given queries and like any other opinion they were not binding on anyone.

After seven years, the matter came up for hearing in the Supreme Court early this year. The Court did nothing to do away with the confusion between the two issues of fatwa and the establishment of Dar-ul-Qaza, perhaps because it was not asked to. It agreed with the Respondents that a fatwa is merely an opinion and neither a fatwa nor a decision of the Dar-ul-Qaza can be enforced like a court decree. According to the Court, for this reason, neither a fatwa nor a decision of the Dar-ul-Qaza has any “sanction under our Constitutional scheme.” However, it categorically upheld both the establishment and functioning of the Dar-ul-Qaza as well as the practice of issuing fatwas, adding that “this does not mean that existence of Dar-ul-Qaza or for that matter, practice of issuing fatwas are themselves illegal. It is (an) informal justice delivery system with an objective of bringing about amicable settlement between the parties. It is within the discretion of the persons concerned either to accept, ignore or reject it.” Holding that fatwas and shariat court decisions were not legally enforceable, the Court refused to grant any of the prayers sought in the petition.

A sensible decision

However, the Court was disturbed by the practice of clerics issuing fatwas on the request of third parties who were strangers to the dispute in question, like in the Imrana case. Mindful of the fact that “since fatwa gets its strength from religion… it causes serious psychological impact on the person intending not to abide by that” and “has the potential of causing immense devastation”, the Court “advised” clerics, and rightly so, that in inter-personal disputes, fatwas ought not to be issued at the request of strangers. With these observations, the Court rejected the prayers. Shariat courts were not declared illegal, fatwas were not declared void and directions were not issued to the government to disband the shariat courts.

The Supreme Court judgment, though it could have been better-worded, is sensible. It is mindful not only of the law of the land and the deplorable condition of Indian Muslims but also of religious sensitivities in the country. It seeks to strike a judicious balance among all three. However, the judgment does not make any practical difference to the legal position as it existed till the day it was delivered. It will neither stop the self-seeking ignorant mullas from issuing bizarre fatwas, which are an onslaught on the basic tenets of Islam, nor prevent ill-informed people from publicly expressing their ostensibly anti-Islamic prejudices under the garb of supporting the cause of equality before law.

(Saif Mahmood is an advocate of the Supreme Court. )

Source: The Hindu

The Sunni-Shia Divide

An ancient religious divide is helping fuel a resurgence of conflicts in the Middle East and Muslim countries. Struggles between Sunni and Shia forces have fed a Syrian civil war that threatens to transform the map of the Middle East, spurred violence that is fracturing Iraq, and widened fissures in a number of tense Gulf countries. Growing sectarian clashes have also sparked a revival of transnational jihadi networks that poses a threat beyond the region.

Islam’s schism, simmering for fourteen centuries, doesn’t explain all the political, economic, and geostrategic factors involved in these conflicts, but it has become one prism by which to understand the underlying tensions. Two countries that compete for the leadership of Islam, Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, have used the sectarian divide to further their ambitions. How their rivalry is settled will likely shape the political balance between Sunnis and Shias and the future of the region, especially in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain.

Alongside the proxy battle is the renewed fervor of armed militants, motivated by the goals of cleansing the faith or preparing the way for the return of the messiah. Today there are tens of thousands of organized sectarian militants throughout the region capable of triggering a broader conflict. And despite the efforts of many Sunni and Shia clerics to reduce tensions through dialogue and counterviolence measures, many experts express concern that Islam’s divide will lead to escalating violence and a growing threat to international peace and security.

Sunni and Shia Muslims have lived peacefully together for centuries. In many countries it has become common for members of the two sects to intermarry and pray at the same mosques. They share faith in the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform similar prayers, although they differ in rituals and interpretation of Islamic law.

Shia identity is rooted in victimhood over the killing of Husayn, the Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, in the seventh century, and a long history of marginalization by the Sunni majority. Islam’s dominant sect, which roughly 85 percent of the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims follow, viewed Shia Islam with suspicion, and extremist Sunnis have portrayed Shias as heretics and apostates.

Sunni Shia Muslim Population Graphic
Source: Pew Research, The Future of the Global Muslim Population, 2011

"A regional war in the Middle East draws ever closer."

~ UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic

Origins of the Schism

Mohammed unveiled a new faith to the people of Mecca in 610. Known as Islam, or submission to God, the monotheistic religion incorporated some Jewish and Christian traditions and expanded with a set of laws that governed most aspects of life, including political authority. By the time of his death in 632, Mohammed had consolidated power in Arabia. His followers subsequently built an empire that would stretch from Central Asia to Spain less than a century after his death. But a debate over succession split the community, with some arguing that leadership should be awarded to qualified individuals and others insisting that the only legitimate ruler must come through Mohammed’s bloodline.

A group of prominent early followers of Islam elected Abu Bakr, a companion of Mohammed, to be the first caliph, or leader of the Islamic community, over the objections of those who favored Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. The opposing camps in the succession debate eventually evolved into Islam’s two main sects. Shias, a term that stems from shi’atu Ali, Arabic for “partisans of Ali,” believe that Ali and his descendants are part of a divine order. Sunnis, meaning followers of the sunna, or “way” in Arabic, of Mohammed, are opposed to political succession based on Mohammed’s bloodline.

Ali became caliph in 656 and ruled only five years before he was assassinated. The caliphate, which was based in the Arabian Peninsula, passed to the Umayyad dynasty in Damascus and later the Abbasids in Baghdad. Shias rejected the authority of these rulers. In 680, soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph killed Ali’s son, Husayn, and many of his companions in Karbala, located in modern-day Iraq. Karbala became a defining moral story for Shias, and Sunni caliphs worried that the Shia Imams—the descendants of Husayn who were seen as the legitimate leaders of Muslims (Sunnis use the term “imam” for the men who lead prayers in mosques)—would use this massacre to capture public imagination and topple monarchs. This fear resulted in the further persecution and marginalization of Shias.

Even as Sunnis triumphed politically in the Muslim world, Shias continued to look to the Imams—the blood descendants of Ali and Husayn—as their legitimate political and religious leaders. Even within the Shia community, however, there arose differences over the proper line of succession. Mainstream Shias believe there were twelve Imams. Zaydi Shias, found mostly in Yemen, broke off from the majority Shia community at the fifth Imam, and sustained imamate rule in parts of Yemen up to the 1960s. Ismaili Shias, centered in South Asia but with important diaspora communities throughout the world, broke off at the seventh Imam. Ismailis revere the Aga Khan as the living representative of their Imam. The majority of Shias, particularly those in Iran and the eastern Arab world, believe that the twelfth Imam entered a state of occultation, or hiddenness, in 939 and that he will return at the end of time. Since then, “Twelvers,” or Ithna Ashari Shias, have vested religious authority in their senior clerical leaders, called ayatollahs (Arabic for “sign of God”). 

Many Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian converts to Islam chose to become Shia rather than Sunni in the early centuries of the religion as a protest against the ethnic Arab empires that treated non-Arabs as second-class citizens. Their religions influenced the evolution of Shia Islam as distinct from Sunni Islam in rituals and beliefs.   

Sunnis dominated the first nine centuries of Islamic rule (excluding the Shia Fatimid dynasty) until the Safavid dynasty was established in Persia in 1501. The Safavids made Shia Islam the state religion, and over the following two centuries they fought with the Ottomans, the seat of the Sunni caliphate. As these empires faded, their battles roughly settled the political borders of modern Iran and Turkey by the seventeenth century, and their legacies resulted in the current demographic distribution of Islam’s sects. Shias comprise a majority in Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, and a plurality in Lebanon, while Sunnis make up the majority of more than forty countries from Morocco to Indonesia.

Early Muslims split into two camps following the death of the Prophet Mohammed. This chronology explains how the sects evolved from 632 until the late twentieth century. (Photo: Abbas Al-Musavi/Brooklyn Museum)



Combat between Ali ibn Abi Talib and Amr Ben Wad near Medina in Arabia. Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection/Brown Library

The Death of Mohammed

Early followers of Islam are divided over the succession of the Prophet Mohammed, who founded the religion in Arabia. Prominent members of the community in Mecca elect Abu Bakr, a companion of Mohammed, with objections from those who favor Ali ibn Abi Talib, Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law. Ali eventually becomes caliph, or ruler of the Islamic community, in 656, and is assassinated in 661 after a power struggle with the governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya. Mu’awiya claims the caliphate and founds the Umayyad dynasty, which rules the Muslim empire from Damascus until 750.

Modern Tensions

Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979 gave Shia cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the opportunity to implement his vision for an Islamic government ruled by the “guardianship of the jurist” (velayat-e faqih), a controversial concept among Shia scholars that is opposed by Sunnis, who have historically differentiated between political leadership and religious scholarship. Shia ayatollahs have always been the guardians of the faith. Khomeini argued that clerics had to rule to properly perform their function: implementing Islam as God intended, through the mandate of the Shia Imams.

Under Khomeini, Iran began an experiment in Islamic rule. Khomeini tried to inspire further Islamic revival, preaching Muslim unity, but supported groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Pakistan that had specific Shia agendas. Sunni Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, admired Khomeini’s success, but did not accept his leadership, underscoring the depth of sectarian suspicions.

Saudi Arabia has a sizable Shia minority of roughly 10 percent, and millions of adherents of a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam known as Wahhabism (an offshoot of the Sunni Hanbali school) that is antagonistic to Shia Islam. The transformation of Iran into an overtly Shia power after the Islamic revolution induced Saudi Arabia to accelerate the propagation of Wahhabism, as both countries revived a centuries-old sectarian rivalry over the true interpretation of Islam. Many of the groups responsible for sectarian violence that has occurred in the region and across the Muslim world since 1979 can be traced to Saudi and Iranian sources.

Saudi Arabia backed Iraq in the 1980–1988 war with Iran and sponsored militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan who were primarily fighting against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but were also suppressing Shia movements inspired or backed by Iran.

The transformation of Iran into an agitator for Shia movements in Muslim countries seemed to confirm centuries of Sunni suspicions that Shia Arabs answer to Persia. Many experts, however, point out that Shias aren’t monolithic—for many of them, identities and interests are based on more than their confession. Iraqi Shias, for example, made up the bulk of the Iraqi army that fought Iran during the Iran–Iraq War, and Shia militant groups Amal and Hezbollah clashed at times during the Lebanese civil war.

Percent of Sunnis who accept Shias as Muslim Infographic

Source: Pew Research, The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, 2012

For their part, both mainstream and hard-line Sunnis aren’t singularly focused on oppressing Shias. They have fought against coreligionists throughout history, most recently in the successive crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia’s battles against al-Qaeda and related Sunni militant groups. Sharing a common Sunni identity didn’t eliminate power struggles among Sunni Muslims under secular or religious governments.

But confessional identity has resurfaced wherever sectarian violence has taken root, as in Iraq after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion removed Saddam Hussein, a dictator from the Sunni minority who ruled over a Shia-majority country. The bombing of a Shia shrine in Samara in 2006 kicked off a cycle of sectarian violence that forced Iraqis to pick sides, stirring tensions that continue today.

In the Arab world, Shia groups supported by Iran have recently won important political victories. The Assad regime, which has ruled Syria since 1970, relies on fellow Alawis, a heterodox Shia sect that makes up about 13 percent of Syria’s population, as a pillar of its rule. Alawis dominate the upper reaches of the military and security services in Syria and are the backbone of the forces fighting to support the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria’s civil war. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq unseated Saddam Hussein and instituted competitive elections, the Shia majority has dominated the parliament and produced its prime ministers. Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia militia and political movement, is the strongest political actor in Lebanon. Iran’s regional influence has swelled as its allies in these countries have accumulated power.

Sunni governments, especially Saudi Arabia, have increasingly worried about their own grips on power, a concern that was exacerbated with the protest movement that began in Tunisia in late 2010. The Arab Awakening, as the uprisings are known, spread to Bahrain and Syria, countries at the fault lines of Islam’s sectarian divide. In each, political power is held by a sectarian minority—Alawis in Syria, where Sunnis are the majority, and a Sunni ruling family in Bahrain, where Shias are the majority. The civil war in Syria, which is a political conflict at its core, has exposed sectarian tensions and become the staging ground for a vicious proxy war between the region’s major Sunni and Shia powers. Some analysts view the Syrian conflict as the last chance for Sunnis to limit and reverse the spread of Iranian power and Shia influence in the Arab world.

Iran’s Islamic revolution, which brought Shias to power in 1979, and the Sunni backlash have fueled a competition for regional dominance. This timeline highlights Sunni-Shia tensions in recent decades. (Photo: Henri Bureau/Corbis)

Practicing the Faith

Sunnis and Shias agree on the basic tenets of Islam: declaring faith in a monotheistic God and Mohammed as his messenger, conducting daily prayers, giving money to the poor, fasting during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.

There are divisions even over the precepts of Islam, but the main difference relates to authority, which sparked the political split in the seventh century and evolved into divergent interpretations of sharia, or Islamic law, and distinct sectarian identities.

Shias believe that God always provides a guide, first the Imams and then ayatollahs, or experienced Shia scholars who have wide interpretative authority and are sought as a source of emulation. The term “ayatollah” is associated with the clerical rulers in Tehran, but it’s primarily a title for a distinguished religious leader known as a marja, or source of emulation. Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was appointed by an elected body of Iranian clerics, while maraji (plural of marja) are elevated through the religious schools in Qom, Najaf, and Karbala. Shias can choose from dozens of maraji, most of whom are based in holy cities in Iraq and Iran. Many Shias emulate a marja for religious affairs and defer to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran for political guidance. For Sunnis, authority is based on the Quran and the traditions of Mohammed. Sunni religious scholars, who are constrained by legal precedents, exert far less authority over their followers than their Shia counterparts.

Both sects have subdivisions. The divisions among Shias were discussed above. Four schools comprise Sunni jurisprudence: Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali, the latter spawning the Wahhabi and Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia. Sunnism, a broad umbrella term for non-Shia Islam, is united on the importance of the Quran and practice of Mohammed but allows for differences in legal opinion.

"Dear Karbala, dear Najaf, dear Kadhimiyah, and dear Samarra, we warn the great powers and their lackeys and the terrorists, the great Iranian people will do everything to protect them."

~ Iranian president Hassan Rouhani

Sectarian Militants

Communal violence between Islam’s sects has been rare historically, with most of the deadly sectarian attacks directed by clerics or political leaders. Extremist groups, many of which are fostered by states, are the chief actors in sectarian killings today.

The two most prominent terrorist groups, Sunni al-Qaeda and Shia Hezbollah, have not defined their movements in sectarian terms, and have favored using anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and anti-American frameworks to define their jihad, or struggle. They share few similarities beyond the use of violence. Hezbollah has developed a pragmatic political wing that competes in elections and is part of the Lebanese government, a path not chosen by al-Qaeda, which operates a diffuse network largely in the shadows. Both groups have deployed suicide bombers, and their attacks shifted from a focus on the West and Israel to other Muslims, such as al-Qaeda’s killing of Shia civilians in Iraq and Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war.

Conflict and chaos have played a role in the reversion to basic sectarian identity. In Iraq, for instance, remnants of the Ba’athist regime employed Sunni rhetoric to mount a resistance to the rise of Shia power following the ouster of Saddam. Sunni fundamentalists, many inspired by al-Qaeda’s call to fight Americans, flocked to Iraq from Muslim countries, attacking coalition forces and many Shia civilians. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded al-Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq, evoked ancient anti-Shia fatwas, or religious rulings, to spark a civil war in hopes that the Shia majority would eventually capitulate in the face of Sunni extremist violence. The Shia community absorbed thousands of deaths before fighting back with their own sectarian militias.

Syria’s civil war, which exceeded the brutality and casualty toll of Iraq’s decade-long conflict in just three years, has amplified sectarian tensions to unprecedented levels. The war began with peaceful protests in 2011 calling for an end to the Assad regime, which has ruled since 1970. The Assad family and other Alawis have stirred resentment by Syria’s majority Sunnis after decades of brutal repression and a sectarian agenda that elevated minority Alawis in government and the private sector. The 2011 protests and brutal government crackdown uncovered sectarian tensions in Syria, which have rippled across the region.

Tens of thousands of Syrian Sunnis joined rebel groups such as Ahrar al-Sham, the Islamic Front, and al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, which all employ anti-Shia rhetoric; similar numbers of Syrian Shias and Alawis enlisted with an Iran-backed militia known as the National Defense Force to fight for the Assad regime. Foreign Sunni fighters from Arab and Western countries joined the rebels, while Lebanon’s Hezbollah and some Shia militias from Iraq such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kata'ib Hezbollah backed the Syrian government. Even Afghan Shia refugees in Iran have reportedly been recruited by Tehran for the war in Syria, pitting them against Sunni foreign fighters who may have forced the Afghans into exile decades earlier. Syria’s civil war has attracted more militants from more countries than were involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia combined.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq, decimated by the “Awakening” of Sunni Iraqis who joined the fight against extremists, the U.S.-led military surge, and the death of Zarqawi, found new purpose in exploiting the vacuum left by the receding Syrian state. It established its own transnational movement known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group expanded its grip on Sunni provinces in Iraq and eastern regions in Syria, seizing Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, in June 2014. It defied orders from al-Qaeda’s top commanders to curtail its transnational ambitions and extremism, which led to ISIS’s expulsion from al-Qaeda in February 2014. ISIS rebranded as the Islamic State in July 2014 and declared its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph.

Extremist groups have come to rely on satellite television and high-speed Internet over the past two decades to spread hate speech and rally support. Fundamentalist Sunni clerics, many sponsored by wealthy Sunnis from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, have popularized anti-Shia slurs. Shia religious scholars have also taken to the airwaves, mocking and cursing the first three caliphs and Aisha, one of Mohammed’s wives.

Sectarian rhetoric dehumanizing the “other” is centuries old. But the volume is increasing. Dismissing Arab Shias as Safawis, a term that paints them as Iranian agents (from the Safavid empire) and hence traitors to the Arab cause, is increasingly common in Sunni rhetoric. Hard-line Sunni Islamists have used harsher historic terms such as rafidha, rejecters of the faith, and majus, Zoroastrian or crypto Persian, to describe Shias. Iranian officials, Iraq’s prime minister, and Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, routinely describe their Sunni opponents as takfiris (code for al-Qaeda terrorists) and Wahhabis. This cycle of demonization has been exacerbated throughout the Muslim world.

For Sunni extremists, new technologies and social-media channels have revolutionized recruitment opportunities. Fundamentalists no longer have to infiltrate mainstream mosques and attract recruits surreptitiously, but can now disseminate their call to jihad and wait for potential recruits to contact them. These channels aren’t as useful for recruiting Shia militants, who benefit from state support in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, and can openly advertise their calls for sectarian jihad.

"Terrorist violence in 2013 was fueled by sectarian motivations, marking a worrisome trend, in particular in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan."

~ U.S. Department of State

Flash Points

Sunni-Shia tensions contribute to multiple flash points in Muslim countries that are viewed as growing threats to international peace and security. The following arouse the most concern among regional specialists:

Rising Militancy

Notable concern about the role of sectarian violence increased in 2013. Extremists were “fueled by sectarian motivations” in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan, according to the U.S. State Department. After years of steady losses for al-Qaeda–linked groups, Sunni extremist recruitment is rising, aided by private funding networks in the Gulf, particularly in Kuwait, with much of the violence directed at other Muslims rather than Western targets. Shia militants are also gaining strength, in part to confront the threat of Sunni extremism, miring many Muslim communities in a vicious cycle of sectarian violence.

U.S. officials such as FBI director James B. Comey have warned that the war in Syria, which attracted thousands of fighters from Europe and the United States, poses a long-term threat to Western interests. The eventual outflow of these militants, battle-hardened and with Western passports, is viewed as a potential “terrorist diaspora” that could eclipse the global terror networks that emerged after the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

Saudi-Iranian Rivalry

Saudi Arabia and Iran have deployed considerable resources to proxy battles, especially in Syria, where the stakes are highest. Riyadh closely monitors potential restlessness in its oil-rich eastern provinces, home to its Shia minority, and has deployed forces along with other Gulf countries to suppress a largely Shia uprising in Bahrain. Saudi Arabia is also providing hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support to the predominantly Sunni rebels in Syria, while simultaneously banning cash flows to al-Qaeda and extremist jihadi groups fighting the Assad regime.

Iran has allocated billions of dollars in aid and loans to prop up Syria’s Alawi-led government, and has trained and equipped Shia militants from Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan to fight with various sectarian militias in Syria. At the same time, the widening proxy battle may also be stirring concern among leaders in Riyadh and Tehran about the consequences of escalation. The two sides were reported to be in talks in May 2014 to establish a dialogue for settling disputes diplomatically.

Humanitarian Crisis

The ongoing civil war in Syria has displaced millions internally, and almost three million civilians, mostly Sunni, are now refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey. The influx of more than a million Syrians into Lebanon, a state with a historically combustible religious mix that experienced its own fifteen-year civil war in the 1970s and 1980s, has burdened its cash-strapped government and pressured communities hosting refugees. Jordan and Iraq are still struggling to provide housing and services to an impoverished and traumatized population. Turkey has the greatest capacity to provide humanitarian aid, yet Ankara must increasingly balance “the public’s sympathy for and unease toward refugees,” the International Crisis Group reports.

Fractured States

Syria’s civil war, as well as Iraq’s sectarian conflict, is threatening to redraw the map of the Middle East bequeathed to the region by British and French colonial authorities. The Assad regime in Syria has consolidated control over the Mediterranean coast, the capital of Damascus, and the central city of Homs, which together comprise a rump state that connects with Hezbollah strongholds, threatening the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Other parts of the country are contested or controlled by various rebel and Islamist groups, including ISIS, which seeks to dominate the eastern regions of Syria that link to its territory in Iraq. And Kurdish groups in northern Syria, which, like their Iraqi cousins, have long campaigned for basic rights denied under the Ba'athist government, are on the verge of gaining de facto independence.

The United States spent more than one trillion dollars to stabilize Iraq, but the country remains in a precarious state. Sectarian tensions are mounting in Iraq as the newly ascendant Shia majority struggles to accommodate the Sunni minority and deal with the Kurdish Regional Government in the north of the country while confronting extremist Sunni groups. Most politicians and activists in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon reject attempts to redraw the map of the region, but the vanishing borders and emergence of new areas of influence based on sectarian and ethnic identities are a growing existential challenge.

"Sunnis had no other option but to defend themselves and use arms. We reached a point of to be or not to be."

~ Tariq al-Hashimi, former vice president of Iraq

Experts

    Geneive Abdo Fellow, Middle East Program, Stimson Center
    Deborah Amos Middle East Correspondent, National Public Radio
    Reza Aslan Associate Professor, University of California, Riverside
    F. Gregory Gause III Senior Fellow, Brookings Doha Center
    Bruce Hoffman Director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University
    Ed Husain Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, CFR
    Vali R. Nasr Dean, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

Source: The Sunni-Shia Divide

శ్రీ కౌముది జూలై 2014

Miracle Crop: India's Quest to End World Hunger

By Philip Bethge

Over one third of humanity is undernourished. Now a group of scientists are experimenting with specially-bred crops, and hoping to launch a new Green Revolution -- but controversy is brewing.

It may not make his family wealthy, but Devran Mankar is still grateful for the pearl millet variety called Dhanshakti (meaning "prosperity and strength") he has recently begun growing in his small field in the state of Maharashtra, in western India. "Since eating this pearl millet, the children are rarely ill," raves Mankar, a slim man with a gray beard, worn clothing and gold-rimmed glasses.

Mankar and his family are participating in a large-scale nutrition experiment. He is one of about 30,000 small farmers growing the variety, which has unusually high levels of iron and zinc -- Indian researchers bred the plant to contain large amounts of these elements in a process they call "biofortification." The grain is very nutritional," says the Indian farmer, as his granddaughter Kavya jumps up and down in his lap. It's also delicious, he adds. "Even the cattle like the pearl millet."

Mankar's field on the outskirts of the village of Vadgaon Kashimbe is barely 100 meters (328 feet) wide and 40 meters long. The grain will be ripe in a month, and unless there is a hailstorm -- may Ganesha, the elephant god, prevent that from happening -- he will harvest about 350 kilograms of pearl millet, says the farmer. It's enough for half a year.

The goal of the project, initiated by the food aid organization Harvest Plus, is to prevent farmers like Mankar and their families from going hungry in the future. In fact, the Dhanshakti pearl millet is part of a new "Green Revolution" with which biologists and nutrition experts hope to liberate the world from hunger and malnutrition.

Global Problem

Today some 870 million people worldwide still lack enough food to eat, and almost a third of humanity suffers from an affliction known as hidden famine, a deficiency in vitamins and trace elements like zinc, iron and iodine. The consequences are especially dramatic for mothers and children: Women with iron deficiencies are more likely to die in childbirth, and they have a higher rate of premature births and menstruation problems. Malnourished children can go blind or suffer from growth disorders. Throughout their lives, they are more susceptible to infection and suffer from learning disorders, because their brains have not developed properly.

"These children are deprived of their future from birth," says Indian agronomist Monkombu Swaminathan, who has campaigned for the "fundamental human right" of satiety for more than 60 years. To solve the problem of hunger once and for all, Swaminathan and other nutrition experts are calling for a dramatic shift in our approach to agriculture. They argue that instead of industrial-scale, high-tech agriculture, farming should become closer to nature -- and involve intelligent plant breeding and a return to old varieties.

The world has enough to eat. The only problem is that the poor, whose diet consists primarily of grain, are eating the wrong food. Corn, wheat and rice - the grain varieties that dominate factory farming -- are bred primarily for yield and not for their nutritional content. They cannot adequately feed the poorest of the poor -- nutrients and trace elements are at least as important as calories.

Food safety is tied to variety, says Swaminathan, who calls for a sustainable "evergreen" revolution. He advocates the development of new, more nutritional grain varieties better adapted to climatic conditions. "We must re-marry agriculture and nutrition -- the two have been too far away from each other for a long time," says the scientist.

The First Revolution

Swaminathan, 88, is considered the father of India's 1960s Green Revolution. He created rice and wheat varieties that were smaller than normal but with substantial higher yields than existing varieties. He also worked with heterozygous plants, so-called hybrids, which are up to twice as productive as their parent generation. The walls of his office in the city of Chennai on the east coast of India are covered with tributes and certificates -- one reads: "India's Greatest Global Living Legend" -- and in 1987, he received the United Nations World Food Prize.

"The Green Revolution was a tremendous success," says Swaminathan. As an adolescent, he lived through the "Great Bengal Famine" that killed millions of Indians in the mid-1940s. "Back then we used to get less than one ton of wheat per hectare (2.5 acres)," says Swaminathan, adding that the yield per hectare has more than tripled since then.

But at what price? Although new high-performance varieties guaranteed high yields, they depleted the soil and consumed far too much water. More and more fertilizer and pesticides were needed. Many small farmers lost everything when they invested in seed grain and were unable to sell their harvest at a profit. Meanwhile, they neglected to grow traditional bread cereals.

"Formerly, the farmers were depending on 200 to 300 crops for food and health security," says Swaminathan, whereas today there are only " "but gradually we have come to the stage of four or five important crops, wheat, corn, rice and soy bean." "The Green Revolution," says the scientist, " did not eliminate hunger and malnutrition."

Springtime in Maharashtra

In India, where about 250 million people, or a fifth of the population, are undernourished, the problem is urgent. Some 50 to 70 percent of children under the age of five and half of all women suffer from an iron deficiency. Almost half of all children are physically underdeveloped or even crippled because they are chronically undernourished or malnourished.

The situation is especially precarious in Maharashtra. In the early morning, we travel out to the countryside with Bushana Karandikar, an economist from the city of Pune (formerly Poona). Karandikar manages the Dhanshakti Project for Harvest Plus. "Malnutrition is the sad part of the Indian growth story," she says during the trip. "It is very surprising, but India is almost in the same league as sub-Saharan African countries, which have much, much lower per capita income."

It is spring, and Maharashtra is green -- the land looks fertile, with its lush fields and fruit plantations lining the road. But as scientist Swaminathan puts it, this is part of "India's enigma": "green mountains and hungry millions."

In the town of Ghodegaon, the problems quickly become apparent. Men, children and, most of all, young women in colorful saris are waiting on an unpaved street outside the town's 15-bed clinic. They remove their shoes at the door to the building, where the walls are decorated with portraits of the gods adorned with garlands of flowers.

Dr. Rajneesh Potnis greets us on the second floor, where we are served sweets and aromatic coffee. Potnis has been working in this clinic for 25 years. His fellow medical students told him he was crazy when he went to Ghodegaon, but Potnis was determined to help people. Today he provides advice to nursing mothers, helps women give birth, and treats conditions like rickets, night blindness and anemia.

"The women are the worst off," says the doctor. "They work the hardest, and yet they eat what's left over." As a result, he explains, they frequently suffer from premature deliveries and stillbirths, infections and sudden attacks of faintness. The tribal people, ethnic minorities which live on the margins of society, are in the worst position. "They only come when they have no other choice."

Potnis hands out mineral and vitamin pills subsidized by the Indian government. He also advises families to eat a varied diet, but his efforts are often futile, he explains. "It's so easy to say to people: Eat more pulses, more vegetables and eggs -- but most of them can't afford any of that."

The Millet Solution

This is where biofortified pearl millet comes into play. Farmers in the region have always grown pearl millet. So why not simply replace the traditional variety with Dhanshakti? "Then people will get their minerals from the bread they eat every day, anyway," says Potnis.

Ramu Dahine's five-person family, in the nearby village of Vadgaon Kashimbe, is a case in point. Daughter-in-law Meena is baking bhakri, a traditional round, unleavened flatbread made from pearl-millet flour. Dressed in a red sari, she crouches on the floor in front of a small stone building with a corrugated metal roof. She combines pearl-millet flour and water, kneads the dough, places the flatbread into a pan and blows through a long tube onto the coals of a small wood fire until flames begin to flicker.

The Dahines eat the bread, and hardly anything else, twice a day. The seed dealer recommended the pearl millet, says the farmer. He doesn't even know that the grain has a high iron content, but he did notice that his family was healthier than usual by the end of the last rainy season. The variety also has another benefit: Because it isn't a hybrid, Dahine can use a portion of his harvest as seed for the next season.

"For the real poor, this pearl millet is a great hope," says Karandikar. Swiss scientists have shown that the consumption of Dhanshakti millet significantly increased iron levels in the blood of local women. And Indian researchers showed that a daily serving of only 100 grams of the pearl millet could completely satisfy the iron requirements of children.

Can a New Revolution Take Root?
But for the global champions of the new, gentle Green Revolution and its campaign against hunger, this is but one of many successful attempts to develop more nutritious grain and vegetable varieties. In Brazil, for example, the research organization Embrapa developed biofortified beans, pumpkins and manioc. In Uganda and Mozambique, farmers are growing a new variety of sweet potato rich in provitamin A. In Rwanda, more than 500,000 families are eating beans enriched with iron. And in India, farmers will soon begin growing rice and wheat with especially high levels of zinc.

The Harvest Plus program has already reached about seven million men, women and children, says program head Howarth Bouis, adding that biofortified grain is expected to improve the nutrition of a billion people by 2030. Bouis' early decision to apply only conventional methods in breeding the new varieties was important to its success. "At Harvest Plus we took the decision not to invest in transgenics, because we wanted to avoid the controversy," he says, remembering all too well the dispute over a variety known as Golden Rice.

The Genetic Engineering Conundrum

The transgenic plant, developed in 1992 at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, contains almost twice as much beta-carotene, a precursor to vitamin A, as ordinary rice. Nevertheless, there has been so much public resistance to genetic engineering that it has yet to be approved for use anywhere in the world.

But in many cases, genetic engineering is unnecessary anyways. There are often natural varieties with grains that already contain the desired vitamins or nutrients. Rice is a perfect example, with about 100,000 varieties in existence worldwide. "You can basically find any trait you can think of," says Swaminathan. In the laboratories of his M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation (MSSRF) in Chennai, scientists are experimenting with high zinc-content rice. The biologists analyzed thousands of rice strains and eventually discovered about a dozen varieties with especially high zinc levels. They are now being crossed with high-yield varieties.

But Swaminathan isn't opposed to choosing the high-tech approach if it can help alleviate hunger. " I won't worship nor discard genetic engineering," he says. "It is important to harness all the tools that traditional wisdom and contemporary science can offer"

Because, for example, it is very difficult to increase iron levels in rice with conventional breeding techniques, the scientists have turned to biotechnology. "We isolated genes from mangroves and introduced them into the genome of rice," explains Ganesan Govindan, one of the bioengineers at MSSRF. The transgenic rice grains contain elevated levels of iron, and the plants are more tolerant of drought and salt. Researchers expect the variety to be ready for market in two or three years.

'25,000 Farmer Suicides'

But these high-tech solutions are also controversial. Vandana Shiva, a prominent opponent of modern agricultural engineering, lives in the Indian capital New Delhi. In the offices of her organization, Navdanya -- located in the affluent neighborhood of Hauz Khas -- are decorated with a flower arrangement on a glass table and clay vases containing sheaves of grain.

Shiva, dressed in a flowing robe and with a large bindi on her forehead, is an impressive figure, steeled by her tough, decades-long battle with the establishment. The civil rights activist never tires of castigating seed companies. "A globally operating industry is pushing hard to make the world dependent on their products," she says. Farmers who have made the switch, she explains, give up their traditional seed and are then forced to buy the commercial varieties, which often come with license fees, in perpetuity.

"This type of agriculture has taken the lives of 25,000 farmers in India, who committed suicide because they couldn't pay back their debts," says Shiva. She doesn't think much of biofortified varieties, either. "Harvest Plus is focused on one nutrient," she says critically. "But a single nutrient is not a solution to multidimensional malnutrition crisis; the body needs all the micronutrients."

Instead of these "monocultures," Shiva is calling for a return to diversity in fields. "Most of our traditional crops are full of nutrients," she explains. Why create Golden Rice with lots of vitamin A when carrots and pumpkins contain plenty of it already? Why develop genetically modified bananas with high iron content when horseradish and amaranth contain so much iron?

Shiva recommends field crop-rotation, and the fostering of vegetable and fruit gardens and small family farms primarily geared toward nutrition instead of maximized profit. Because Shiva believes organic farming is the only viable approach to defeating hunger, her organization has trained 75,000 farmers in organic farming methods since the late 1980s.

'There Isn't Enough Arable Land'

Harvest Plus Director Bouis believes that Shiva's approach is naïve. "We have the fundamental problem that there isn't enough arable land for a constantly growing population," he says.

A UN Environment Programme report predicts that by 2050, agriculture will have to produce 70 percent more calories than today to feed an expected global population of 9.6 billion people. This "food gap" can only be closed, says Bouis, if we "make agriculture even more productive."

But in Maharashtra, it's clear that new varieties of super grains are not always the entire answer. A third farmer from the town of Vadgaon Kashimbe, Santosh Pingle, 38, and his family are visibly better off than their neighbors. They live in a plastered house, they have cows and goats for milk, and they enjoy the occasional luxury of a chicken from the market. Pingle's recipe for success is that he has done more with his land than other farmers.

The farmer grows iron-rich Dhanshakti millet to satisfy the iron needs of his family of five. On the other half of their field, the Pingles grow tomatoes and high-yield hybrid millet, which they sell in the market. They also grow protein-rich pulses and other vegetables in their house garden, and his wife Jayashree and her daughters harvest lemons, coconuts and mangoes several times a year.

The Pingles are well on their way to achieving "prosperity and strength" -- and they always have enough to eat.

Translated from the German by Chritopher Sultan

Source: SPIEGEL ONLINE

India in 'dereliction of duty' over rapes: UN watchdog

AFP | June 20, 2014, 11.06 am IST

India has been struggling to overcome its reputation for sexual violence since 
the fatal gang rape of a student in New Delhi in December 2012 (Photo: DC)

Geneva: Indian law enforcement and justice authorities have shirked their responsibility to fight sex attacks, a UN child rights watchdog said on Friday, amid uproar over the horrific gang-rape and lynching of two girls.

"There has been a dereliction of duty in relation to rape cases," said Benyam Mezmur, deputy chairman of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.

India has been struggling to overcome its reputation for sexual violence since the fatal gang rape of a student in New Delhi in December 2012, which sparked mass protests and drew international condemnation of India's treatment of women.

Public outrage was re-ignited last month by the deaths of two girls, aged 12 and 14, who were gang-raped and lynched in their impoverished village in Uttar Pradesh.

A string of other headline-making cases have piled pressure on the authorities.

The UN committee is made of up 18 independent experts who monitor the implementation of international children's rights treaties. The panel held a hearing with Indian officials earlier this month.

In its conclusions on that session, released Thursday, it said it was alarmed by "widespread violence, abuse, including sexual abuse, and neglect of children".

It pointed to data showing that one in three rape victims in India is a minor and that half of the abusers were known to the child or in a position of trust and responsiblity.

"We're not only interested about those cases that attract international media attention," said Mezmur.

He said they were the tip of the iceberg. "We're also very much concerned about those that do not benefit from the media attention, do not get to be reported to the authorities, do not command a protest in the streets of the cities or the villages where they have been committed."

A rape occurs every 22 minutes in India, according to government figures.

India brought in tougher laws last year against sexual offenders after the New Delhi gang-rape.

But the legislation, which was also designed to educate and sensitise police on rape cases, has failed to stem the tide of violence.

And the UN committee noted that the 2013 law failed to criminalise sexual abuse of girls over the age of 15, provided they were married -- in contradiction with legislation passed the previous year on child protection.

Mezmur said there were major concerns about the "implementation gap" between different federal and state laws, a lack of capacity to apply rules, and inadequate crime data.

The UN committee also criticised comments from political leaders who have played down the problem.

Among them have been state BJP ministers who have said that rapes happen "accidentally" or are "sometimes right, sometimes wrong".

The UN committee also urged India to take immediate measures to prevent female infanticide and abandonment of girls, and ensure implementation of rules against sex-selective abortions.

Source: Deccan Chronicle

An old disfigurement

Pratap Bhanu Mehta | Twitter@@pbmehta | June 20, 2014 12:57 am

The most important signal this government needs to send is 
that it is going to write a new chapter in the history of Indian 
institutions.

It seems that the NDA has not learnt the first lesson from the UPA’s mistakes. It appears hell bent on continuing the decimation of institutions that has been the bane of Indian politics. The same contagion of small-mindedness that corroded the UPA is spreading its poison, under the facade of the new. The joke doing the rounds in Delhi, that the party in power has changed but the politicians, lawyers and bureaucrats have not, seems to be coming true, alas. The surprise is not that it’s business as usual. The surprise is how quickly business as usual has asserted itself.

Think of the unseemly spectacles unfolding around us on institutions. The hallmark of a new governance paradigm is that one party does not use the past misdeeds of the other as an alibi to repeat the same mistakes. Yet this is exactly what has happened in the way in which this government has handled the matter of governors. An article of faith in a civilised democracy is that we sometimes hold our noses, but give the offices the respect due to them. After they assume office, governors are not individuals belonging to a party; they have to be judged in relation to a role. This government is right to say that certain political appointees, like H.R. Bhardwaj, demeaned the office of the governor by playing low politics. But that is at best an argument for transferring a couple of governors in states where there were reasonable political apprehensions. It is not an argument for the wholesale denigration of the office. One of the distortions the UPA produced was upsetting the constitutional deference due to offices. The idea of secretaries calling up governors, as if they were minions in the civil service, and asking them to leave, reflects a culture of corroded institutions, where all formal deference is subordinated to political whim. The objection made is that the governors, by virtue of being Congressmen, are unfit to be governors, that they will somehow not transmit what one spokesman called the “national agenda”. But this is tacitly admitting that the last set of governors were right to do the Centre’s bidding; now the government wants a set that can do its bidding rather than discharge the duties of the office. The government’s argument against the Congress would be more credible if there were some undertaking that the next set of governors would be more non-partisan.

The contagion of petty partisanship will now afflict a large number of other institutions. A range of bodies, from the Indian Council for Cultural Relations to the National Commission for Women, will have their heads replaced. Again, the desire of this government to appoint people it deems fit is not unreasonable. There is also something unseemly in a country where people do not gracefully offer their resignations, giving the new government a chance to rejig. But by asking for wholescale resignations, the underlying message that goes out is simple: there are institutions that do not have an identity and mission that can be identified independently of partisan politics. We may not like everything the past occupants of these positions have done, but by reducing these institutions to mere politics, we shrink them in the long run. The itch to reward supporters after a major victory is understandable. But the crudity and haste with which people are being eased out will diminish future occupants because the office has been diminished.

The mistakes continue. The UPA’s besetting sin was an incurable casualness. Just think of the chain of events that led up to the Andhra fiasco. The advisory order requiring many states to communicate in Hindi suggests exactly that same lack of forethought. India has a delicate language settlement, hard-won through careful compromise and informal conventions. This settlement has served India well. Indeed, it has even served the cause of Hindi well, allowing it to grow without being associated with the fears of state domination. This is exactly the kind of issue on which it is not worth creating distracting noise that unnecessarily raises fears.

One reason we want institutions is that they are necessary to securing certainty and liberty alike. Some NGOs deserve scrutiny and certainly, any illegal actions need to be accounted for. But the manner in which the government has handled the supposed leak by the IB is creating a climate of uncertainty and fear, and empowering all those who wish to intimidate independent actors in civil society. This was exactly the same mistake the UPA made twice over. It first created an environment of uncertainty and intimidation. It then went on to craft laws like the amendments to the FCRA Act, whose sole purpose is to give the state more discretionary power over citizens. If the NDA was serious about governance, it should reprimand the IB for doing a shoddy job on facts, for letting the report leak, and it must address the climate of intimidation that is being created in its wake.

Admitted, it’s early days yet, and in the larger scheme of things, these may be small matters. But these are telling signs in so far as governments usually get more, not less, arrogant with time, as the UPA showed. The government is right to think that economic development is uppermost on people’s minds.

But underlying our logjam in development was the breakdown of institutions. Every single ministry is beset by an institutional crisis, which is at the core of its failures: the HRD has, in the past, treated autonomous institutions as appendages to the ministry when convenient, the main weakness of environmental processes is not delay but the fact that the ministry has made their integrity hard to defend, the office of the attorney general has acted as the political arm of government, not an office of law, the relationship between civil servants and ministers, between the cabinet secretariat and secretaries, has been skewed beyond recognition, and the ministry of finance failed to craft a credible new narrative on inflation instead of repeating “hoarders” on auto pilot, because there are few honest brokers left within the government system who can stitch together an all things considered narrative.

The most important signal this government needs to send is that it is going to write a new chapter in the history of Indian institutions. It should repeat this like a mantra: no institutions, no development. But more than playing footloose with institutions, this creeping display of conventional politics has a disfiguring moral psychology behind it. It shows a pettiness that sits at odds with India’s challenges and aspirations.

The government quickly needs to show that it is not going to be business as usual, that its institutional conduct will elevate the smallest office, not diminish even the highest ones. It is not too late for that lesson.

The writer is president, Centre for Policy Research, Delhi, and a contributing editor for ‘The Indian Express’

express@expressindia.com

 

       Pratap Bhanu Mehta

Source: The Indian Express

... see how caste is disappearing fast!

Freedom is the only condition of growth; take that off, the result is degeneration. With the introduction of modern competition, see how caste is disappearing fast! No religion is now necessary to kill it. The Brahmin shopkeeper, shoemaker, and wine-distiller are common in northern India. And why? Because of competition. No man is prohibited from doing anything he pleases for his livelihood under the present government, and the result is neck and neck competition, and thus thousands are seeking and finding the highest level they were born for, instead of vegetating at the bottom.

Letter to Alasinga. November 2, 1893. Complete Works, 5. 23.

From Swamiji's article in the February 1895 issue of the New York Medical Times. Complete Works, 9. 286.
Vivekananda Vedanta Network

Out of my mind: Who’s afraid of Hindutva?

Meghnad Desai | June 15, 2014 12:26 am

Nationalism is a 19th century European idea. 

The electoral history of the BJP shows it has learnt that no party can
win a majority by being merely Hindu majoritarian.

I  live under an Anglican Christian monarchy, not a secular State. In the House of Lords, we have 26 bishops and each day begins with an Anglican prayer. Yet I live in a tolerant secular society. There are faith schools run by various Christian denominations and other religions. There are also State schools which are secular. Elsewhere in Europe there are Christian Democratic and Christian Socialist parties.

No one has thought of them as breaching secularism.

In India, over the years, the dread word has been Hindutva. The BJP is routinely described as a Hindu nationalist party. This is supposed to send a shudder down the spines of all good secular Indians. While the election was being fought, the spectre was created of Narendra Modi as some dangerous dictator — Hitler was frequently mentioned — who was about to impose Hindutva on India. The implication was that he would decimate all Muslims. Many secular parties almost wished that Muslims would believe that story and rush to vote for them. Alas, that did not happen. There are estimates that a fifth of Muslim votes went to the BJP. The Catholic Church in Goa and elsewhere urged people to vote for secular parties. Maybe the voters decided the BJP was a secular party.

What is Hindutva and why is it so dangerous as its critics want to make it out to be? At one level, it just means Hindu-ness rather like Panjabiyat. Gandhiji thought Ambedkar lacked Hindutva, which was not far from the truth. Savarkar, who wrote an essay on Hindutva, was an atheist and an enthusiast for European-style modernisation as an answer for India. His arguments with Gandhiji in London in 1909 led the latter to write Hind Swaraj. Nehru chose the Savarkar path after Independence and modernised India along European lines while keeping Gandhi on a pedestal.

Nationalism is a 19th century European idea. There were few nations as of 1900. Italy had just become one and Savarkar wrote a biography of Mazzini. As European nations began to be formed after the break-up of empires at the end of the First World War, the question arose, ‘What defines a nation?
Poland, Hungary and Romania and other new nations fixed on the idea of a nation being constituted of a people who primordially belonged to the soil. The words nation, race and people were used interchangeably.

The Indian elite who gathered at the Congress sessions during the first few decades were politely asking for concessions from the British rather than arguing for nationalism. There was the Hindu revivalist movement of Dayananda Saraswati, Vivekananda and then much more politically of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, which was one basis for building the idea of an Indian nation. The Muslim elite had doubts about democracy where the majority could swamp the minority. To get Muslims on board, the Congress and Muslim League negotiated a joint platform at the 1916 Lucknow meeting for seat-sharing where Jinnah played a crucial role. The climax for Hindu-Muslim cooperation came in the Khilafat movement, which Gandhiji launched and after Chauri Chaura suspended. Hindu-Muslim unity became elusive after that.

Savarkar was looking for a European-style argument for Indian nationhood. Following that logic, he began by defining Hindutva as the basis for what constituted a nation for people living in the territory that was India before Independence. Much of the essay is concerned about showing that the word Hindu does not come from Persian but is derivative of Sindhu. His stance was without doubt hostile to recognising Muslims as equal parts of the Indian nation unless they accepted India as their motherland.

The times have moved on. India is a nation and a nation state. The electoral history of the BJP shows it has learnt that no party can win a majority by being merely Hindu majoritarian. Neither Ram Mandir nor the destruction of Babri Masjid delivered a majority. The argument for nationhood even for a Hindu majoritarian party has to be inclusive. That in my view is what Modi offered and voters have bought. Let us see how well he delivers on his promise.

Source: The Indian Express

శ్రీ కౌముది జూన్ 2014

Modi happened in Election 2014

This Lok Sabha election was a structural break for India as its voters comprehensively rejected their Nehru-Gandhi past.

 Written by Surjit S Bhalla | May 20, 2014 8:49 am



Essentially, the Indian polity has called the Congress’s bluff,
seen it for the calculating set of politicians they have been.

Just what happened on May 16? In a word, Modi. Of course, there are several other factors that determined the contours of Election 2014, but the defining characteristic was the PM-designate, Narendra Modi. Can one individual define an election? Possible, if that individual rightly senses the mood of the country, and its changing sense of direction. Recall what happened in that other defining election, albeit of a lower seismic magnitude — Barack Obama in 2008. The parallels are close — a black man winning the presidency in a country where the blacks obtained civil rights just 50 years ago; a lower caste OBC winning in a country where caste matters a lot. Post the 2008 election in the US, one found out that maybe white Americans are not that racist after all; post-May 16, India has found out that caste has ceased to occupy an important place in the minds of voters.

So what did happen in India? Several myths abound as to what explains Modi’s record-breaking win — 336 seats for the NDA, and the highest ever seat per vote recorded for any alliance or party in India, that is, nine seats for every 1 per cent of the vote. In the record-setting 1984 election, the Congress obtained 8.5 seats for each per cent vote. A partial listing of the myths:

Myth 1: The Congress lost because it operated a corruption and scam infested regime: Commonwealth Games, Coalgate, 2G, etc. As if UPA 1, and all governments before, have not been corrupt. Corruption is one of the factors affecting voters’ choice, but not a very important factor. Else, why would all opinion and exit polls suggest that corruption was one of the least important determinants of voters’ choice? And just look at the results for the Aam Aadmi Party, which ran exclusively against crony capitalism and corruption — and managed to win only four of the 432 seats it contested, and lost its deposit in 413, another record.

Myth 2: The Congress lost because of a weak economy — high inflation and low growth. I am a card-carrying member of the club that believes that economic performance determines voting behaviour. But this election was not an average election, to which average explanations are applicable. By itself, the weak economy and corruption would mean that the Congress and UPA would lose seats. But to lose 200 seats is a black swan event. In 2009, with the best economy ever, the UPA gained “only” 54 seats, and the NDA lost “only” 26 seats. So, with the worst economy ever, one might have expected the NDA and UPA to go back to approximately their 2004 levels, that is, around 200 for both the UPA and NDA. Indeed, according to the CNN-IBN tracker poll, both alliances were in a near neck-to-neck battle as late as August 2013.

Myth 3: Anti-incumbency, voter fatigue after 10 years of UPA rule resulted in the Modi win. When all else fails, indulge in an anti-incumbency explanation. Too many counter examples exist. Remember 2009, when the incumbent UPA got elected. Or Madhya Pradesh 2003, when Digvijaya Singh, and the Congress, got unceremoniously voted out after 10 years in power. Or Modi’s Gujarat, or Chouhan’s MP, returned for a third and second consecutive term, respectively.

Myth 4: The weak leadership of Rahul Gandhi affected the Congress’s performance. Imagine that any individual but Modi was the leader of the BJP — say, L.K. Advani, Rajnath Singh, Arun Jaitley, Sushma Swaraj or Shivraj Chouhan. No one was betting that any of these individuals would offer a large difference with respect to the UPA leadership. The common refrain of many, including myself, has been that there isn’t a naya paisa’s worth of difference between the UPA and NDA. And there hasn’t been — till Modi came along.

So what explains the Modi win? The UPA campaign offered two all important “reasons” to vote for the UPA. Vote for us because we do so much for you, and don’t vote for Modi because he is evil.

Look what the Congress guaranteed to the Indian citizen, especially the poor. A jobs guarantee programme, so that the poor had jobs. A food security bill, so that two-thirds of the population was guaranteed food at throwaway prices. A land acquisition bill, so that the poor got a fair price. A right to information act, and a Lokpal bill, so that corrupt government officials could be caught red-handed. And yet, the Congress managed to win only 44 out of 543 seats, about half of what the BJP got in only its second election in 1989.
 
Modi is evil, we are not: An important fact about the recent election, and possibly related to the overwhelming beyond-expectations majority that Narendra Modi obtained, is that, to the best of my knowledge, no individual in Indian or world history has been unjustly vilified as much as Modi has been. This vilification continues even to this day, especially by the “sickular” parties and their left-intellectual storm troopers. I am choosing my words wisely, because the condemnation campaign has almost universally invoked images of the Nazi and Fascist European regimes of the 1930s.

What is most informative, and disturbing, about these storm troopers (among whom are many domestic and foreign journalists), is that they invariably belong to the Congress party and/or have been its sympathisers until recently. Let me make my position clear, possibly for the umpteenth time. Narendra Modi was chief minister at the time the Gujarat riots happened just as Rajiv Gandhi was the prime minister of India at the time the Delhi pogrom against Sikhs occurred. Both have to assume responsibility for what happened under their watch. All I am asking is whether the Congress storm-troopers, or Modi-baiters, have ever condemned Rajiv Gandhi and/ or the Congress party with the same language and allusions to Hitler as they have done, and continue to do, about Modi?

Morality and philosophy aside, an election is not an absolute choice but rather a choice between individuals. So, especially in the case of the Congress versus Modi, the issue of 2002 versus 1984 is irrelevant, that is, individuals who are upset by Modi should be equally (if not more) upset by the Congress.

Strategic Voting by Muslims — backfired: In the Muslim and Yadav states of UP and Bihar, the turnout was higher by about 12 percentage points. Did the UPA whizkids consider that their strategy of concentrated Muslim and Yadav voting against Modi might engineer a counter-strategy — for every one Muslim and Yadav (MY) that indulged in strategic voting, there were probably four non-MY voters ensuring that the negative strategy (sic) did not succeed.

Essentially, the Indian polity has called the Congress’s bluff, seen it for the calculating set of politicians they have been. Their governance demanded not only change, but wholesale rejection. The Indian polity has elected a leader. The “historical low” losers contend that all Modi has done is package a dream, a dream that will not last, a dream that will soon become a nightmare. The losers, and Congress apologists, believe that Modi will soon crash to earth. I have no doubt that the expectations of the Modi government are sky high, and that it is impossible for the transformed reality to be an equal match to the expectations. Equally, I have no doubt that the Modi-led government will make a strong effort to match a large fraction of these expectations — and that they will largely succeed.

The writer is chairman of Oxus Investments, an emerging market advisory firm, and a senior advisor to Zyfin, a leading financial information company.

Source: The Indian Express

Why It’s So Hard for Men to See Misogyny

Men were surprised by #YesAllWomen because men don’t see what women experience.

By Amanda Hess

When Santa Barbara police arrived at Elliot Rodger’s apartment last month—after Rodger’s mother alerted authorities to her son’s YouTube videos, where he expressed his resentment of women who don’t have sex with him, aired his jealousy of the men they do choose, and stated his intentions to remedy this “injustice” through a display of his own “magnificence and power”—they left with the impression that he was a “perfectly polite, kind and wonderful human.” Then Rodger killed six people and himself on Friday night, leaving a manifesto that spelled out his virulent hatred for women in more explicit terms, and Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown deemed him a “madman.”
Amanda Hess Amanda Hess

Amanda Hess is a Slate staff writer. Email her at amanda.hess@slate.com, or follow her on Twitter.

Another rude awakening played out on social media this weekend as news of Rodger’s attack spread around the world. When women took to Twitter to share their own everyday experiences with men who had reduced them to sexual conquests and threatened them with violence for failing to comply—filing their anecdotes under the hashtag #YesAllWomen—some men joined in to express surprise at these revelations, which amassed more quickly than observers could digest. How can some men manage to appear polite, kind, even “wonderful” in public while perpetuating sexism under the radar of other men’s notice? And how could this dynamic be so obvious to so many women, yet completely foreign to the men in their lives? Some #YesAllWomen contributors suggested that men simply aren’t paying attention to misogyny. Others claimed that they deliberately ignore it. There could also be a performative aspect to this public outpouring of male shock—a man who expresses his own lack of awareness of sexism implicitly absolves himself of his own contributions to it.

But there are other, more insidious hurdles that prevent male bystanders from helping to fight violence against women. Among men, misogyny hides in plain sight, and not just because most men are oblivious to the problem or callous toward its impact. Men who objectify and threaten women often strategically obscure their actions from other men, taking care to harass women when other men aren’t around.

Placating these men is a rational choice, a form of self-defense to protect against setting off an aggressor.

The night after the murders, I was at a backyard party in New York, talking with a female friend, when a drunk man stepped right between us. “I was thinking the exact same thing,” he said. As we had been discussing pay discrepancies between male and female journalists, we informed him that this was unlikely. But we politely endured him as he dominated our conversation, insisted on hugging me, and talked too long about his obsession with my friend’s hair. I escaped inside, and my friend followed a few minutes later. The guy had asked for her phone number, and she had declined, informing him that she was married and, by the way, her husband was at the party. “Why did I say that? I wouldn’t have been interested in him even if I weren’t married,” she told me. “Being married was, like, the sixth most pressing reason you weren’t into him,” I said. We agreed that she had said this because aggressive men are more likely to defer to another man’s domain than to accept a woman’s autonomous rejection of him.

A week before the murders, I experienced a similar dynamic when I went for a jog in Palm Springs, California. It was early on a weekend morning, and the streets that had been full of pedestrians the night before were now quiet. When I paused outside a convenience store to stretch, a man sitting at a bus stop across the street from me began yelling obscene comments about my body. When my boyfriend came out of the convenience store, he shut up.

These are forms of male aggression that only women see. But even when men are afforded a front seat to harassment, they don’t always have the correct vantage point for recognizing the subtlety of its operation. Four years before the murders, I was sitting in a bar in Washington, D.C. with a male friend. Another young woman was alone at the bar when an older man scooted next to her. He was aggressive, wasted, and sitting too close, but she smiled curtly at his ramblings and laughed softly at his jokes as she patiently downed her drink. “Why is she humoring him?” my friend asked me. “You would never do that.” I was too embarrassed to say: “Because he looks scary” and “I do it all the time.”

Women who have experienced this can recognize that placating these men is a rational choice, a form of self-defense to protect against setting off an aggressor. But to male bystanders, it often looks like a warm welcome, and that helps to shift blame in the public eye from the harasser and onto his target, who’s failed to respond with the type of masculine bravado that men more easily recognize. Two weeks before the murders, Louis C.K.—who has always recognized pervasive male violence against women in his stand-up—spelled out how this works in an episode of Louie, where he recalls watching a man and a woman walking together on a date. “He goes to kiss her, and she does an amazing thing that women somehow learn how to do—she hugged him very warmly. Men think this is affection, but what this is is a boxing maneuver.” Women “are better at rejecting us than we are,” C.K. said. “They have the skills to reject men in the way that we can then not kill them.”

When Elliot Rodger finally snapped, he drove to a Santa Barbara sorority house as part of his plan to give the “female gender one last chance to provide me with the pleasures I deserved from them,” and killed two women who were walking outside. Before he hit the sorority house, he stabbed three men in his apartment; after he left the sorority, he killed another man who was entering a nearby convenience store. In the course of the attack, he wounded 13 more people. Rodger hated all the women who did not provide him sex, but he also resented the men he felt had been standing in the way of his conquests, though they were never made aware of this belief. (Many men die of domestic-violence-related murders this way, killed by ex-boyfriends, ex-husbands, and family members of the women in their lives.) Some men are using this death count to claim that Rodger’s killings were not motivated by misogyny, but that is a simplistic account of how misogyny operates in a society that privately abides the hatred of women unless it’s expressed in its most obvious forms.

Source: Slate

Amanda Hess is a Slate staff writer. Email her at amanda.hess@slate.com, or follow her on Twitter.